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Each year, film studios spend over $1 billion on the 
mechanics of duplicating and distributing films to 
exhibition venues located across the U.S. With the advent 
of digital cinema projectors, much of this expense can be 
eliminated through more cost efficient digital distribution 
methods.  
 
SATCOM links provide for a very efficient and cost 
effective digital cinema distribution model but piracy is a 
major concern; SATCOM links are easy to intercept and 
loss of a pristine, successful, first run film to pirates could 
have major financial repercussions. The experience with 
Direct Satellite Services (DSS) has not been encouraging. 
There are an estimated 3 million unauthorized users using 
cloned versions of the tamper resistant smart cards that 
seek to prevent this. Furthermore, cinema stakeholders are 
risk adverse towards piracy based on the music industry’s 
experience with Napsterization. Music sales are down for 
the fourth year in a row (9% in 2002) and company 
valuations are down 40%, in part because of piracy.  
 
As a consequence, there has been significant interest in 
providing location-based security for digital cinema 
distribution and forensic analysis in the event of piracy.  
In this application, the same, large (25 to 190 Gbyte), 
encrypted media file might be used at multiple theatre 
locations nationwide but with distinct GeoLocked keys 
specific to the intended recipient location and its 
exhibition license. This provides a secure and efficient 
point-to-multipoint distribution model for delivery via 
satellite or DVD. At the exhibition hall, robust 
watermarking/steganographic techniques can introduce 
location, time and exhibition license information into the 
exhibition for subsequent use in piracy investigations. 
 
This paper starts by describing a geo-encryption approach 
that builds on established cryptographic algorithms and 
protocols in a way that provides an additional layer of 
security beyond that provided by conventional 
cryptography.  It allows data to be encrypted for a specific 
location(s) or for specific area(s), e.g. a studio’s campus 
area. Constraints in time and velocity as well as location 
can also be enforced. We then discuss a process of 
applying successive geo-encryptions at the originating 
node to enforce specific geographic routings for 
transmission to the final destination node. 
 
We then describe the process of creating and distributing 
digital cinema content with an eye towards security 
requirements. One of the more difficult issues is the large 
number of mutually mistrustful parties involved in the 
process. We specifically show how time & location 
constraints introduced via geo-encryption can provide 
architectural features needed to allow untrusted parties to 
act cooperatively to bring the exhibition to the screen 
while maintaining a high degree of protection against 
piracy. Suborning a single party does not lead to “loss of 
the film”. We also show how these mechanisms can help 
protect the fiduciary interests of the various parties by 
giving each an enforceable say in whether or not the 




Pirated versions of “Star Wars: Attack of the Clones” 
were available on the Internet two days before its first 
theatrical release. At advance screenings of “Finding 
Nemo”, Disney hired security firm Burns Pinkerton to 
screen audiences using metal detectors and night vision 
goggles. Specifically, they were looking for anyone 
carrying video recording equipment(s). The measures 
were effective; the first bootleg versions of “Finding 
Nemo” didn’t show up on the Internet until two days after 
the first theatrical release. 
 
Piracy is a real and growing concern to the film industry. 
According to Rich Taylor, a spokesman for the MPAA, 
“It’s estimated we lose between $3 billion and $4 billion a 
year to this problem despite strong anti-piracy actions by 
the movie industry.” [Reuters, May 30, 2003] 
 
The advent of digital cinema projection systems could 
exacerbate the problem; loss of a pristine, successful, first 
run film to pirates could have major financial 
repercussions. Bootleg versions generally have poor video 
and sound quality and do not demand high street prices. 
Pirates who successfully capture the original digital 
version of a theatrical release could create DVD quality 
versions demanding a higher street price. Additionally, 
many buyers of bootleg versions later purchase the 
commercial DVD release because of quality issues. 
Improved bootleg quality would lessen their incentive to 
purchase authorized DVD versions.  
 
Compounding the issue, cost effective digital cinema 
distribution methods favors transmission methods subject 
to easy interception. Satellite transponder signals are 
readily intercepted using receiver technology comparable 
to that used in DSS. DVDs can be duplicated on a $300 
DVD Recorder. 
 
In spite of all these issues (or because of them), there is 
strong motivation to widely deploy digital cinema. Each 
year, film studios spend over $1 billion on the mechanics 
of duplicating and distributing films to exhibition venues 
located across the U.S. With the advent of digital cinema 
projectors, much of this expense can be eliminated 
through more cost efficient digital distribution methods.  
 
At the same time, digital cinema can provide an avenue 
for incorporating additional security features not available 
with the current “analog” distribution chain. Highly 
secure encryption and authentication technologies can be 
used to thwart unauthorized access to digital films and 
persistent watermarking features can be used to 
discourage bootlegging and assist prosecution efforts. 
Precise location and timing information, when combined 
with extant security algorithms can promote these 
objectives by restricting access to certain locations and 




Geo-encryption builds on established cryptographic 
algorithms and protocols in a way that provides an 
additional layer of security beyond that provided by 
conventional cryptography.  It allows data to be encrypted 
for a specific place or broad geographic area, and supports 
constraints in time as well as space.  It can be used with 
both fixed and mobile applications and supports a range 
of data sharing and distribution policies.  It provides full 
protection against attempts to bypass the location feature.  
Depending on the implementation, it can also provide 
strong protection against location spoofing. 
 
The term “location-based encryption” is used here to refer 
to any method of encryption wherein the cipher text can 
only be decrypted at a specified location.  If an attempt is 
made to decrypt the data at another location, the 
decryption process fails and reveals no information about 
the plaintext.  The device performing the decryption 
determines its location using some sort of location sensor, 
for example, a GPS receiver or some other satellite or 
radio frequency positioning system. 
 
Location-based encryption can be used to ensure that data 
cannot be decrypted outside a particular facility, for 
example, at a particular theatre, the headquarters of a 
government agency or corporation, or an individual’s 
office or home.  Alternatively, it may be used to confine 
access to a broad geographic region.  Time as well as 
space constraints may be placed on the decryption 
location. 
 
A Short Tutorial On Encryption Algorithms 
 
Encryption algorithms can be divided into two categories: 
symmetric algorithms and asymmetric algorithms. 
Referring to figure 1, symmetric algorithms use the same 
key for encrypting and decrypting plaintext. Numerous, 
very fast symmetric algorithms are in widespread use 
including: DES & Triple-DES as described in [1] and the 
newly released Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
described in [2]. Keeping the key private is essential to 
maintaining security and therein lies the crucial question: 
how to share keys securely. Numerous techniques have 
been developed and the interested reader is directed to [3] 
for further discussion. 
 
Asymmetric algorithms are comparatively new on the 
scene with the first published description [4] in 1976. 
Also known as Public Key algorithms, these algorithms 
have distinct keys for encryption and decryption as is 
shown in figure 2. Here, Key_E can be used to encipher 
the plaintext but not to decipher it. A separate key 
(Key_D) is needed to perform this function.  
 
In principle, to securely convey the plaintext, the intended 
recipient could generate a key pair (Key_E, Key_D) and 
send Key_E, the public key, to the originator via 
unsecured channels. This would allow the originator (or 
anyone else) to encrypt plaintext for transmittal to the 
recipient who uses Key_D, the private key, to decrypt the 
plaintext.  
 
RSA, named after its creators Rivest, Shamir & Adleman 
is perhaps the most popular asymmetric algorithm in use 
today. Its security is based on the difficulty of factoring 
large prime numbers. 
 
One major drawback with asymmetric algorithms is that 
their computational speed is typically orders of magnitude 
(~1,000) slower than comparable symmetric algorithms. 
This has led to the notion of hybrid algorithms such as the 












Here, a random key, sometimes called the session key, is 
generated by the originator and sent to the recipient using 
an asymmetric algorithm. This session key is then used by 
both parties to communicate securely using a much faster 
symmetric algorithm. The hybrid approach has found 
wide application, most notably on the Internet where it 
forms the basis for secure browsers (Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL)) and secure e-mail.  
 
The GeoEncryption Algorithm 
 
In principle, one could attach location and time 
specifications to the ciphertext file and build devices that 
would decrypt the file only when within the specified 
location & time constraints. There are several potential 
problems with such an approach: 
 
• The resultant file reveals the physical location of 
the intended recipient. The military frowns on 
this sort of thing, at least for their own forces. 
Furthermore, it provides vital information to 
someone who wants to spoof the device. 
 
• If the device is vulnerable to tampering, it may 




























bypass the location check.  The modified device 
would decrypt all received data without 
acquiring its location and verifying that it is 
correct.  Alternatively, an adversary might 
compromise the keys and build a modified 
decryption device without the location check.  
Either way, the modified device could be used 
anywhere and location would be irrelevant 
 







As another possibility, one might consider using location 
itself as the cryptographic key to an otherwise strong 
encryption algorithm like AES.  This is ill advised in that 
location is unlikely to have sufficient entropy 
(uncertainty) to provide strong protection.  Even if an 
adversary does not know the precise location, there may 
be enough information to enable a rapid brute force attack 
analogous to a dictionary attack. For example, suppose 
that location is coded as a latitude-longitude pair at the 
precision of 1 centimeter, and that an adversary is able to 
narrow down the latitude and longitude to within a 
kilometer.  Then there are only 100,000 possible values 
for each of latitude and longitude, or 10 billion possible 
pairs (keys).  Testing each of these would be easy.    
 
Applying an obfuscation function to the location value 
before using it as a key could strengthen this approach; 
however, the function would have to be kept secret in 
order to prevent the adversary from doing the same.  In 
general, security by obscurity is scoffed at, because once 
the secret method is exposed, it becomes useless.  The 
entire security system collapses like a house of cards.   
 
A guiding principle behind the development of 
cryptographic systems has been that security should not 
depend on keeping the algorithms secret, only the keys.  
This does not mean that the algorithms must be made 
public, only that they be designed to withstand attack 
under the assumption that the adversary knows them.  
Security is then achieved by encoding the secrets in the 
keys, designing the algorithm so that the best attack 
requires an exhaustive search of the key space, and using 
sufficiently long keys that exhaustive search is infeasible. 
 
GeoCodex’s GeoEncryption algorithm addresses these 
issues by building on established security algorithms and 
protocols. Referring to figure 4, our approach modifies 
the previously discussed Hybrid algorithm to include a 
GeoLock. 
 
On the originating (encrypting) side, a GeoLock is 
computed based on the intended recipient’s Position, 
Velocity, and Time (PVT) block. The PVT block defines 
where the recipient needs to be in terms of position, 
velocity & time for decryption to be successful. The 
GeoLock is then XORed with the session key (Key_S) to 
form a GeoLocked session key. The result is then 
encrypted using an asymmetric algorithm and conveyed 
to the recipient, much like we saw in the Hybrid 
algorithm of figure 3. On the recipient (decryption) side, 
GeoLocks are computed using an AntiSpoof GPS receiver 
for PVT input into the PVT→GeoLock mapping function. 
If the PVT values are correct, then the resultant GeoLock 
will XOR with the GeoLocked key to provide the correct 
session key (Key_S). 
 
PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
 
Sidestepping the issue of what constitutes an AntiSpoof 
receiver for the moment, we now address how GeoLocks 
are formed. Figure 5 shows a notional diagram of a 
PVT→GeoLock mapping function where latitude, 
longitude and time constitute the inputs. Here, a regular 
grid of latitude, longitude and time values has been 
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 Figure 5: PVT→GeoLock Mapping Function 
  spacing must take into account the accuracy of the 
 receiver at the decrypting site; otherwise erroneous 
Lock values may result. It makes no sense to have 
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Conversely, if using an RTK style receiver capable of 
2cm accuracy, 10-meter grid spacing is overly 
conservative. Grid spacing may also be wider in the 
vertical direction to account for poorer vertical 
positioning accuracy typical in most sets because of 
satellite geometries [5]. 
 
Figure 6 shows the number of possible grid points on the 
planet as a function of grid spacing, ignoring altitude, 
time and velocity.  
 
A more complete PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
could actually have eight inputs: 
 
• Position (East, North, Up) 
• Velocity (East, North, Up) 
• Time 
• Coordinate System Parameters 
 
The velocity inputs might actually map into a minimum 
speed requirement so as to ensure that the recipient is 
actually underway. Including coordinate system 
parameters in the PVT→GeoLock mapping function 
provides support for non-stationary reference frames. This 
feature might be used, for example, in communicating 
through, or with, a satellite. 
 
The grid could just as well be based on a Military Grid 
Reference System (MGRS) or it’s close cousin UTM. In 
fact, any arbitrary shapes could have been used; for 
example the shape of the post production facility’s 
campus could map to a single GeoLock value so as to 
permit successful decryption when located in the campus 
but not when outside. 
 
Finally, we note that the PVT→GeoLock mapping 
function itself may incorporate a hash function or one-
way function with cryptographic aspects in order to 
hinder using the GeoLock to obtain PVT block values. 
Similarly, the algorithm may be deliberately slow and 
difficult; perhaps based on solving a difficult problem. 
 
A Few Quick Observations On AntiSpoof Receivers 
 
Most civilian receivers are trivially simple to spoof; 
simply hook up one of the many excellent signal 
simulators available and the receiver will buy into 
whatever PVT values you want [6,7]. This is why military 
receivers use Y-code; an encrypted version of P-code. 
Unless the spoofer has access to the correct cryptographic 
keys and knows how to generate Y-code from P-code, it 
can’t spoof the military set. He may be able to jam it, but 
not spoof it. 
 Figure 6: Number of Distinct Grid Locations Current civil signal architectures provide no such 
protections; they operate without any security features 
whatsoever. The Galileo system is likely to incorporate 
some as yet undisclosed security features in their 
Commercial Services (CS) signals but thus far, attempts 
to incorporate security features into civil GPS have been 
rebuffed. 
 
Civilian sets can be made difficult to spoof through a 
series of hardening measures. These include a variety of 
signal’s checks: 
 
• Use J/N meter to check for above normal energy 
levels 
• Monitor C/No meter for Consistency/ 
Unexpected C/No given J/N 
• Monitor Phase Difference Between Antenna 
Elements (All signals shouldn’t come from the 
same direction) 
• Deep Acquisition to Look for Weak, Real 
Signals 
 
Numerous navigation checks can also be instituted: 
 
• Compare “Watch Time” with “Signals Time” 
(Most signal generators can’t synchronize with 
GPS time) 
• Continuity Checks in Time and Position (There 
is no hyperspace button in real life) 
• Consistency with other Navigation Sensors 
• Large Residuals, Particularly in Differential 
Correction Channel(s) 
• RAIM Type Functions 
 
With careful attention to detail, civilian sets do not have 
to be as vulnerable to spoofing as most of them are. 
 
Relay Encryption to Force a Particular Routing & For 
Authentication 
 
Successive Geo-encryption can be used to force data 
and/or keys to follow a specific geographical path before 
it can be decrypted. This is achieved by applying multiple 
geo-locks at the origination node prior to transmittal using 










































required node is traversed, one layer of GeoLocking is 
removed, thus ensuring the desired path has been 
followed. 
 
Relay encryption might be useful for applications that 
employ regional distribution centers for the distribution of 
data supplied by producers.  For example, in subscription 
television, the producers could be the television networks, 
while the distributors are cable or satellite television 
providers.  A producer could lock a key initially to a 
geographic region covered by one of the distributors using 
a key known only to the subscribers, and then to the 
precise location of the distributor using the distributor’s 
key.  The distributor would unlock its geo-lock before 
broadcasting the programming to subscribers, who would 
then unlock the regional geo-lock and decrypt the 
ciphertext. 
 
In some applications, it may be desirable to know that a 
message has followed a particular route. Figure 8 depicts 
a process similar to the Route Forcing technique for 
achieving this, where each traversed node in effect stamps 
the message with its PVT values. 
 
 
DIGITAL CINEMA DISTRIBUTION 
 
“Today, the film studios spend over $1 billion each year 
to duplicate, distribute, rejuvenate, redistribute and 
ultimately destroy the thousands of film reels required to 
bring the close to 500 films released each year to 
audiences across the U.S.” Booz Allen Hamilton: 
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SATCOM links provide for a very efficient and cost 
effective digital cinema distribution model but piracy is a 
major concern; SATCOM links are easy to intercept. The 
experience with Direct Satellite Services (DSS) has not 
been encouraging. There are an estimated 3 million 
unauthorized users using cloned versions of the tamper 
resistant smart cards that seek to prevent this. 
Furthermore, cinema stakeholders are risk adverse 
towards piracy based on the music industry’s experience 
with Napsterization. Music sales are down 8% and 
company valuations are down 40%, in part because of 
piracy.  
 
As a consequence, there has been significant interest in 
providing location-based security for digital cinema 
distribution and forensic analysis in cases of piracy.  
GeoCodex has been working with Digital Cinema 
Ventures (DCV) to develop security techniques specific 
to this industry. 
 
In this application, the same, large (25 to 190 Gbyte), 
encrypted media file might be used at multiple theatre 
locations nationwide but with distinct GeoLocked keys 
specific to the intended recipient location and its 
exhibition license. This provides a secure and efficient 
point to multipoint distribution model applicable to 
distributions via satellite or DVD. At the exhibition hall, 
robust watermarking/steganographic techniques can 
introduce signed location, time and exhibition license 
information into the exhibition for subsequent use in 
piracy investigations. 
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Additionally, in films involving location shoots, studio 
executives often require “dailies”, the day’s output, to be 
sent back via satellite in order to evaluate progress. 
Security is a major consideration as IP theft is rampant in 
the industry. The dailies might actually be sent back to the 
studio via satellite under protection of GeoEncryption. 
 
Figure 9 depicts a media key distribution reference model 
wherein a Studio Control policy is maintained. In this 
model, we start with the Telecine, which produces the 
Digital Source Master (DSM), an uncompressed, highest 
resolution digital version taken from the film masters. 
Alternatively, this could be the output of the digital 
camera used in filming or the output of a digital rendering 
system used for CGI and animation. 
 
The postproduction house color corrects, edits, assembles 
and converts the Digital Source Master into multiple 
versions, possibly for presentation and exhibition on a 
variety of media (e.g. Theatre, DVD, Cable TV). For 
digital cinema distribution, the postproduction facility 
uses the DSM to create a Digital Cinema Distribution 
Master (DCDM) with appropriate resolution, color space, 
audio format, subtitles, captions and metadata. Each 
essence component (e.g., image, audio, subtitle) will be a 
separate data file and is known as a DCDMce.  
 
The component DCDMce files are then optionally 
compressed and encrypted and then put into a 
standardized package or payload referred to as the Digital 
Cinema Package (DCP). The DCP is then optionally 
encrypted again for transport to the theaters. The decision 
to encrypt the transport stream rests with the 
transport/distribution provider.  
 
Once the DCP arrives at the theater complex, the transport 
stream is decrypted (if required), and the DCP is broken 
down into the DCDMce data files for storage on the 
theatre’s file server. The Theatre server then provides the 
still encrypted media file to an authorized, tamper 
resistant projector, which contains sufficient buffering to 
source the real-time decryption and exhibition of the 
media file(s). 
 
Placing four successive locks on the random key (ala. 
Figure 7), the studio proxy can force the key(s) to traverse 
the distribution carrier’s server which takes off its locking 
layer (U4A), the Theatre server which takes off its 
locking layer (U3A) and finally, the projector which takes 
off its locking layer (U2A) and the studio’s lock (U0A).  
Only the projector and the studio proxy can access the 
random key(s) needed to decrypt the media file(s). 
Intervening stages of distribution are critically involved in 
key transmittal and partial decryption, but they have no 
access to the plaintext media. 
 
In examining figure 9, it is important to note the 
distinction between the key distribution message (black) 
and a locking or unlocking facility (blue). The notation 
accompanying the key distribution message simply 
indicates which locks are in effect along each path. The 
facilities notation indicates a node’s capability with 
regards to locking and/or unlocking the key file as well as 
the source of that capability.  We also note that the key 
distribution message can contain content in addition to a 
key, for example, digital signatures and certificates 
vouching for the source of the key. 
Figure 9: Media Key Distribution Reference Model 
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bution Message  
 
In the studio control paradigm, the studio proxy generates 
all public/private key pairs and distributes appropriate 
portions to entities in order to provide facilities. Figure 10 
depicts a variation on this scheme, the distributed control 
version, wherein intervening nodes apply GeoLocks 
rather than remove them. Under this paradigm, all of the 
intervening nodes must provide their corresponding 
unlocking facility to the projector before it can access the 
film. 
Figure 10: Media Key Distribution Reference Model 
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Shared Access Control Using Secret Sharing 
 
People tend to be the weakest link in security. 
 
On the subject of computer security: “…the 
mathematics are impeccable, the computers are 
vincible, the networks are lousy, and the people 
are abysmal.” Bruce Schneier, “Secrets & Lies, 
Digital Security in a Networked World 
 
Network and computer security is rarely breeched using a 
brute force attack against cryptographic elements; the 
algorithms are simply too strong. Instead, attackers rely 
on myriad techniques that take advantage of operating 
systems features, attack protocols, use insider access, 
exploit human weaknesses, or obtain information through 
social engineering. 
 
In the DoD, it has long been recognized that security is 
greatly enhanced by forcing distributed access control. 
Secure storage facilities often require two or more 
individuals to gain access. The simplest method is to give 
each individual only part of the combination lock’s 
combination. Security is further enhanced by forcing a 
validation and logging procedure; for example, a call to 
the security guard before opening the alarmed facility to 
avoid an armed response.  
 
In the civil sector, shared access control security 
procedures can also play a role in enforcing contract 
provisions. A close examination of the methods of figure 
10 reveals that earlier nodes can bypass the security of the 
later nodes if they can gain access to the projector directly 
and at subsequent nodes, additional encryption is applied 
only to the keys and not the media file. This is typically 
the case for point-to-multipoint distributions where the 
identically encrypted media file is sent to multiple 
locations for reasons of cost efficiency (e.g. satellite 
transponder). While means have been identified for 
restricting access to the projector, there are more flexible 
alternatives. 
 
Figure 11 depicts a mechanism for preventing bypass by 
incorporating a secret sharing algorithm into the key 
distribution process. Here, the studio proxy creates a 
GeoLocked key and then breaks it into shares using a 
secret sharing algorithm. Each share is in a sense, a part 
of the combination lock’s combination. GeoLocked 
shares are then sent to the various constituents who then 
decode them and then forward them to the projector, 
possibly after performing their own GeoLocking action. 
 
Unlike a mechanical combination lock though, there is 
considerable flexibility in how shares are constructed. 
Shares may be constructed using a “k of n” algorithm [3] 
where n shares are created but any set of k shares is 
sufficient to reconstruct the original input. Policy can be 
set so that no one “shareholder” can compromise the key. 
Similarly, policy can be set so that no one shareholder’s 
share absence can veto the exhibition process. 
Alternatively, shares can be created that must be present 
in order for the assembly process to succeed. In effect 
these shares have veto powers. 
 
Additionally, shares do not have to be created equal. As 
an example, one concern expressed by NATO (National 
Association of Theatre Owners), is the desire to avoid 
having so called “dark screens” in the event of a security 
SNAFU. Disappointing an audience is not in anyone’s 
interest. For this reason, policy might allow the studio 
proxy to generate a special share, that when combined 
with a projector share allows the show to go on. Such a 
share would only be distributed on an emergency basis. 
 
Related to this question is the issue of share validation. 
How does each shareholder know that they in fact have a 
valid share and that that share carries the stated weight in 
share assembly? This is important for two reasons; one is 
in establishing that the required shares are apriori 
available for the exhibition to proceed without actually 
assembling the shares. A second is for each shareholder to 
have confidence that they really have a say so regarding 
the exhibition in accordance with the previously agreed 
upon policy. Such issues can be addressed using dealer 
cheating detection algorithms and/or share verification 
[8,9]. 
 
Referring back to figures 9 & 10, we also note that the 
projector should report back to a security monitoring 
entity to allow for security violation prevention & 
detection. Analogous to “calling the security guard before 
opening the vault”, this function checks to make sure the 
proposed share assembly is an authorized and expected 
event, and that it is taking place at the correct location. 
Enforcement may be in the form of the security 
monitoring entity providing its veto share only after 
establishing that the proposed share assembly is valid.  





The projector should also maintain a security log showing 
all accesses to keys and subsequent exhibitions. A secure, 
append only security logging mechanism should be used 
to ensure there are no deletions in the activities log. One 
way to do this is to append the digital signature [10] from 
log entry n-1 to message n before signing it. Timestamps 
and locationstamps from a secure GPS can also be 




When piracy occurs, the question of WHO is obviously of 
extreme interest but WHEN and WHERE are also of great 
interest. These can help establish the WHO, and from a 
prosecutorial perspective, perhaps help to prove it. 
 
GeoEncryption protects the media file from piracy at all 
distribution points along the path from the Studio Proxy 
to the Projector.  Because these sites lack the keys and 
proper location to decrypt the media file, a pirate would 
be unable to acquire the plaintext.  The media file is 
potentially vulnerable to piracy at the Projector, however, 
after it has been deciphered for viewing.  Although the 
Projector can be hardened to minimize this risk, it would 
be desirable to have a backup mechanism in place in case 
such piracy occurs.  Also, we need to address the problem 
of video cameras being used to bootleg a copy directly off 
of the screen. The backup mechanism could help 
determine the perpetrator as well as when and where the 
piracy took place.  
 
Digital watermarks offer such a mechanism.  In particular, 
the Projector could be designed to automatically 
watermark the media file upon decryption.  The 
watermark could include location and time information, 
the projector ID, signatures, and so forth.  If a pirated, 
watermarked media file is found, this information could 
provide useful evidence for establishing its source. 
 
We also note that the same secure GPS device providing 
PVT values for GeoDecryption might provide signed 
location and time information for use in watermarking. 
This would ensure the integrity of the location 
information.  In addition, the Projector might sign all of 
the data with its private key. 
 
The field of digital watermarking [11] is a vast one, and 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a few additional 
comments are in order. Watermarks can be used to 
achieve several objectives including: 
 
• Tamper detection 
• Information hiding 
• Alerting potential pirates to risk 
 
Depending on the objective, different types of 
watermarking may be used. Fragile watermarks are used 
to detect tampering while very robust (persistent) 
watermarks may be used to hide information, even 
through several encode/decode stages, each using 
different standards. This is needed to ensure the bootleg 
copy still contains the desired information. Alerting a 
potential pirate to the presence of hidden watermarks may 
deter him, but it may also encourage him to try and 
sanitize his product. If the hidden information is 
sufficiently robust, it may survive or else, force the 
bootlegger to be so aggressive in his sanitization so as to 




Media piracy is a rapidly growing problem threatening the 
financial viability of the media industries. Digital 
distribution channels offer tremendous benefits, but with 
significant risks. Unless the security issues are fully 
addressed, the promise of digital distribution is unlikely to 
be fulfilled. GeoEncryption provides methods to control 
access to media based on location, time and velocity that 
builds on the foundations of more traditional 
cryptographic techniques. This is significant in that 
provides strong controls over the when and where of a 
media file’s usage. Additionally, it discourages cloning 
techniques such as those that plague the DSS industry. A 
successful clone would operate at only one position and 
time frame and is therefore not particularly useful. 
 
The specific GeoEncryption implementation discussed 
provides full protection against location bypass and, 
depending on the implementation, it also can provide 
strong protection against location spoofing. It also enjoys 
the efficiency of symmetric encryption, important in 
decrypting very large digital cinema files. 
 
Adding secret sharing methods to the process further 
enhances security by requiring multiple entities to 
cooperate in order to gain access to the media file. This 
helps to prevent single point security failures in that it 
restricts each party’s ability to compromise security. It 
also allows for very flexible security policy in terms of 
veto powers, share weighting, and dark screen prevention. 
 
With a suitable method of watermarking, the 
GeoEncryption security framework could also support 
anti-piracy measures for the plaintext, even after it is 
properly decrypted. 
 
Finally, we would note that GeoEncryption has 
applications outside of digital cinema, including military 
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